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European Review of Agricultural Economics Advance Access originally published online on November 30, 2006
European Review of Agricultural Economics 2006 33(4):562-590; doi:10.1093/erae/jbl027
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© Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2006; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The status quo bias and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: impact of voting rules, the European Commission and external changes

Jan Pokrivcak1,, Christophe Crombez2 and Johan F. M. Swinnen3

1 Slovak Agricultural University, Nitra, Slovakia
2 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, and Stanford University, California, USA
3 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

Corresponding author: Jan Pokrivcak, Slovak Agricultural University in Nitra, Department of Economics, Tr. A. Hlinku 2, 949 01 Nitra, Slovakia. E-mail: jp02{at}fem.uniag.sk

Received January 2003; Revision received September 2006. We develop a formal model of EU decision-making on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The model is used to evaluate under what conditions CAP reform occurs and what the influence of the European Commission (Commission) is on CAP reform. We find that the voting and amendment rules in the Council of the European Union, the number of policy instruments and external changes have important impacts on the occurrence and extent of CAP reform and on the influence of the Commission. Stricter voting rules increase the status quo bias and reduce Commission influence, whereas stricter amendment rules increase both the status quo bias and Commission influence. More significant external change results in more reform and more Commission influence.

Keywords: political economy, agricultural policy, political process, policy reform

JEL classification: Q18, D72, D78


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