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European Review of Agricultural Economics Advance Access originally published online on February 10, 2006
European Review of Agricultural Economics 2006 33(1):73-92; doi:10.1093/erae/jbi037
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© Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2006; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Self-enforcing contracts in agriculture

Ola Kvaløy

University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway

Corresponding author: Ola Kvaløy, University of Stavanger, 4036 Stavanger, Norway. Telephone: 47 51 83 15 82. Fax: 47 51 83 37 50. E-mail: Ola.Kvaloy{at}uis.no

Received April 2005; Revision received January 2006. This article examines a self-enforcing contract between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent who is able to hold up values ex post. It shows that risk aversion and variance can only partly explain the contract's incentive intensity. Ex post bargaining power and outside options will also determine contract choice. If the agent's ex post bargaining position is weak, the principal cannot commit to high-powered incentives, whereas if the agent's ex post bargaining position is good, the agent cannot commit to low-powered incentives. The model may thus explain some puzzles in agricultural contracts, in particular why risk-averse agents sometimes accept to be governed by high-powered incentive contracts that are quite similar to fixed rental contracts, and why risk-neutral agents are sometimes offered share contracts with lower-powered incentives.

Keywords: relational contracts, hold-up, moral hazard, risk aversion


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