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© 1989 Oxford University Press and the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics

research-article

Rent seeking in North-South agricultural trade

GERALD C. NELSON*

Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois U.S.A.

Received March 1, 1988; Revision received June 1, 1988.

Summary

Until the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, LDCs have not lobbied systematically for DC agricultural trade liberalization either individually or as a group, despite the strong probability that such liberalization would increase LDC income. The paper reviews previous hypotheses for this behaviour and identifies another explanation. DC agricultural distortions sometimes result in income transfers to a group of LDC agricultural producers who lobby both at home and abroad for the continuation of the DC distortions. Examples from cassava and sugar trade are discussed.


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